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1 Introduction
Standard asset pricing models assume that assets are held by a representative agent
and, even when this assumption is relaxed, little investigation is devoted to the most
obvious source of heterogeneity: investment can be made by individual investors
or by professionally-managed funds. Very few works analyze the di¤erent invest-
ing behavior of individuals and institutional investors. Some notable exceptions
are Lakonishov and Maberly (1990)1, Cohen (2003)2 and Jain (2007).3 These works,
however, analyze the di¤erent trading patterns without investigating the possible dif-
ferent impact of information asymmetry on these two broad categories of investors.4
The objective of the present work is testing whether investors with a di¤erent de-
gree of sophistication are di¤erently a¤ected by informational asymmetry. The only
paper -to our knowledge- addressing, at least partially, this issue is by Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2001): they consider Finnish institutional sectors investing in domestic
rms nding that familiarity factors5- distance, language and culture- play a stronger
role for less sophisticated investors, such as households and non prot institutions.6
1They document di¤erences in trading patterns of individuals and institutional investors for high
frequency transactions to explain the so-called weekend e¤ect.
2He nds that individuals reduce their exposure to equities more than institutions during the
trough of the business cycle buying stocks from institutions after market increases and selling after
market decreases.
3He shows that individual investors prefer to invest in dividend-paying rms whereas institutional
investors- relatively lower-taxed- tend to prefer rms engaging in larger share repurchases.
4Actually, the informational superiority of institutional investors on individuals is a crucial point
in Jain (2007) but it is postulated and never tested.
5Note that we will use the expression familiarity factors and proximity variables as synonims
throughout the paper.
6Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) analyze domestic investment in Finnish rms considering their
distance, language and culture with respect to the investor (6% of the Finnish population speaks
Swedish, and there are also di¤erences in terms of cultural background).
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However, proximity variables represent a quite narrow subset of proxies capturing
investment barriers. Other relevant factors might indeed di¤erently impact portfolio
positions according to the degree of sophistication of investors thus weakening or
further reinforcing the proximity e¤ect. We depart from Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2001) work since, allowing for international portfolio diversication, we can test the
di¤erent role of a larger set of country-specic variables in driving portfolio allocation
decisions. In particular, households, typically non professional investors, will have
less easily access to information on rm-specic characteristics than institutional in-
vestors and will be more inuenced by country-specic factors. We focus on foreign
investment at market level rather than on domestic investment at individual rm
level (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). Furthermore, relying on the international eq-
uity dataset, we consider, beyond the proximity variables, also other country-specic
factors capturing informational barriers and which might potentially have a di¤erent
impact for investors with various degrees of sophistication.
The higher degree of home bias in householdsportfolios with respect to profes-
sional investors is a signal that they might be more severely a¤ected by information
asymmetry and, consequently, are likely to benet more from its alleviation. We test
this conjecture considering the determinants of foreign equity portfolios of house-
holds7 and professional investors for four European investing countries -France, Italy,
Spain and Sweden. In our work, we investigate the impact of informational asymme-
7Note that, throughout the paper, we adopt the term households meaning households and no
prot organizations. In fact, for data comparability across countries and for data matching be-
tween CPIS and OECD National Accounts (see Appendix C) we consider non prot organizations-
representing an almost negligible fraction- and households as the same consolidated sector. The
results of Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) on the similar responsiveness of households and non prot
organizations to geographical and cultural distances seem to legitimate this consolidation.
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try for households and nancial investors by considering the di¤erent role of country-
specic factors in foreign equity portfolios. We consider, among the country-level
determinants, proximity variables such as distance, common border and common
language. They have been extensively used in the trade literature as determinants
of trade ows between countries and, more recently, the same approach has been
used for equity ows (Portes et al., 2001; Portes and Rey, 2005) and equity holdings
(Chan et al., 2005 among the others). However, these variables have been included
considering, as investor, either the overall economy (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2005,
2007; Sorensen et al., 2007; Amadi, 2004; Faruqee et al., 2004) or mutual funds
(Chan et al., 2005). We consider, instead, as in Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001),
di¤erent institutional investing sectors in order to detect whether the strength of the
impact of proximity variables on stockholding is related to the degree of sophistica-
tion of the investor. Furthermore, previous literature has mainly documented that
unenforceable contracts, legal and regulation complexity unequivocally deter foreign
direct investments. Recently, Gelos and Wei (2005) nd that country transparency
a¤ects also portfolio investment in emerging markets. We check the role of "opacity"
in determining foreign portfolio investments in developed markets and test whether
this role - if any- is stronger for less sophisticated investors to which rm-specic
information may be available less easily than to nancial investors. Finally, rms
stocks listing in foreign markets have evidenced to alleviate informational asymme-
tries and to be more present in foreign portfolios (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001;
Pagano et al., 2002). Ahearne et al. (2004) show that, at aggregate level, the higher
the portion of a countrys market that has a public US listing the higher the countrys
4
weight in the US portfolio. However, the literature has never explicitly tested, to the
best of our knowledge, the informational e¤ect of stock market consolidation. The
merger of national exchange markets into a common exchange market might, in fact,
play a role in reducing information asymmetry and its e¤ect on portfolio allocation
might depend on the investors degree of sophistication. We consider the role of the
common exchange market Euronext, controlling for the liquidity e¤ect in order to
disentangle the informational component.
Our results point out to a stronger impact of proximity variables and transparency
of the destination stock market for households. Moreover, we nd a crucial role of
common-listing, controlling for liquidity, only for less sophisticated investors: rms
publicly listing in a common exchange -such as Euronext- are subject to standardized
regulations and homogenizations of accounting rules with the e¤ect of alleviating
information asymmetry for households directly investing in the stock market.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is worth making two important consider-
ations.
The rst point concerns householdsa priori choice to invest their nancial wealth
directly on the stock market or through nancial intermediation. Households may
decide to invest directly in the stock market since the higher expected gain (if any)
determined by the intermediated investment is below the intermediation cost. As-
suming that the expected reward to risk ratio of intermediated investment is common
knowledge and that all households face the same cost for intermediation, the choice
on whether investing directly or not depends on the household-specic degree of in-
formation a¤ecting the (perceived) riskiness of direct investment. In these terms,
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considering di¤erent degree of information level in the households, we can imagine a
marginal investor for which the cost of indirect investment equals the benet in terms
of reduced perceived return variability. All investors with an information level lower
than the marginal investor will buy the nancial intermediation service while house-
holds with an easier access to information than the marginal investor will choose to
invest directly on the stock market. The focus of this work is on di¤erent strate-
gies of end-investors and, consequently, we restrict the analysis to the self-selected
better informed investing households who decide to invest directly on the stock mar-
ket. Hence, our results, revealing the stronger impact of information asymmetry for
households than for nancial institutions, do hold for a self-selected better informed
fraction of households and should hold, even more severely, for the (unobservable)
fraction of households investing indirectly through nancial institutions.
The second aspect worth stressing is the direct linkage of our research with the
literature on lack of diversication of households in the stock market (Campbell,
2006)8. Lack of diversication and preference for local assets has been found both
in aggregate data (Lewis, 1999) and in household-level data. For instance, Huber-
man (2001) nds that individual investors prefer to own the stocks of their local
telecommunication company. Feng and Seasholes (2004) nd that Chinese individ-
8It is interesting to note that also the literature on the so-called stockholding puzzle is, indirectly,
related to our research. Guiso and Jappelli (2005) point out the (un)awareness of the menu of assets
available -and so information costs and barriers- as explanation for the stockholding puzzle (or lack
of participation puzzle). Merton (1987), in fact, points out that investors purchase only securities
they know about. In some way, the lack of diversication can be seen as non participation to foreign
stock market. In fact, if unawareness (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005) or xed entry costs (Haliassos and
Bertaut, 1995; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003) are plausible explanations for households lack of participa-
tion to stock market, the same motives -more broadly dened as information asymmetry between
home and foreign investors- can be seen as responsible of their lack of participation in foreign stock
market, that is of lack of diversication of households.
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ual investors overweight not only local companies but also companies traded on a
local exchange suggesting a connection between cross-listing reasons and familiarity.
The fact that households are more heavily a¤ected by informational issues is
immediately evident looking at the higher fraction of domestic assets held by house-
holds than by nancial investors. When restricting the analysis to foreign stocks, we
nd that households and non prot organization are more prone to invest in stocks
closer in cultural and geographical terms, more reluctant to invest in more opaque
stock markets and attracted by stocks listed in their own stock exchange. Since
investing households are more heavily a¤ected by information issues than nancial
institutions, the removal of these barriers should benet households relatively more
and increase their international diversication.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate the econometric
setting and in Section 3 we implement the empirical analysis and derive results.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Estimable equation
Our theoretical framework is very standard and simply captures the equilibrium
portfolio allocations when investors are supposed to face di¤erent costs investing in
N stock markets. We adopt Gehrig (1993) approach in modelling information asym-
metries and, more in general, investment barriers9. In Gehrig (1993) contribution
9In order to dissipate any possible source of confusion we want immediately to dene which is
the interpretation of asymmetric information we will spouse throughout the paper. In a standard
setting with asymmetric information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) an informed investor has a
lower perceived variance due to its private signal but, at the same time, her perceived expected
return is generally also di¤erent from the uninformed investors. It implies that we should some-
times observe "foreign-bias" when the domestic investors observe bad signals. What we, instead,
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foreign investments appear on average more risky to domestic investors -leading to
an information-based justication to home bias- and the portfolio of each investor
is di¤erent depending on the perceived variance-covariance matrix. We consider
this approach focussing on foreign investment only, considering a di¤erent investor-
specic perceived variability of return for each foreign stock index in the investment
opportunity set. Details on the derivation of the model are provided in Appendix A.
When considering di¤erent investors k in the same country l the optimal portfolio
weight in asset j (wklj) is
wklj =
1
Dklj
MSj (1)
where MSj is the market share of asset j and
1
Dklj
represents the relative (with
respect to world average) "advantage" of sector k in country l investing in asset j10.
In other words, the sector k in country l will demand a share of asset j greater than
its market share in proportion to
1
Dklj
(inverse of relative investment cost).11
label "information asymmetries" is closer to the concept of "model uncertainty" or "Knightian
uncertainty" (Epstein and Miao, 2003 and Uppal and Wang, 2003): roughly speaking, the foreign
investors perceived uncertainty is higher than that of the domestic investor, though both have the
same perceived return. This approach may help to understand home bias because small di¤er-
ences in the ambiguity about the return distributions can lead to largely under-diversied portfolio
holding. Our formulation is a special case of ambiguity aversion: foreign investors believe that the
true variance is in the interval [l; h] and so they behave as if the variance were h. The same
reasoning applies when considering the allocation in several foreign stock markets rather than the
choice home-foreign assets.
10Dklj represents the relative barrier (with respect to world average) of sector k in country l
investing in asset j:
11Note that if Dklj = 1, i.e. if the investment barrier for sector k in country l is equal to the
average one then the market share of asset j will be optimally held in equilibrium.
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The ratio
wklj
MSj
can be interpreted as the bias in asset j by investor k in country l :
if the actual position wklj is larger than js market share then there is a positive bias
while a ratio lower than one reveals a negative bias. The above relation implies that
the bias in asset j by investor k residing in country l depends upon the reciprocal
of the bilateral specic investment barrier relative to the world average investment
barrier. In other words, the larger the bilateral specic investment barrier relative
to the world average the lower the actual position in a given asset12.
Since we are considering the institutional sector as investors we estimate a sepa-
rate pooled-OLS regression for each institutional sector k for all investing countries.
We adopt a "Least Square Dummy Variable Estimation" with xed e¤ects for in-
vesting countries, time dummy and White correction of variance-covariance matrix.
Since Dklj is not directly observable we have to estimate the equation making use of
proxies. In order to capture the unobservable
1
Dklj
variable we consider i di¤erent
proxies, denoted by rel_proxyikj to emphasize that what matters in determining the
wedge between the actual position and the market share is the relative investment
barrier with respect to the world average barrier.
12Our theoretical framework is equivalent to Chan et al. (2005) and Cooper and Kaplanis (1994)
return-reducing approach. Also in their equilibrium condition, in fact, what matters is the invest-
ment barrier relative to the average one. Adopting this approach in which investment barriers
enter in a multiplicative way, our equation, conveniently, turns out to be directly implementable
and interpretable in log terms.
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However, since proxies at investor level -households or nancial investors- are not
available we have to rely on common country-specic variables for investors residing
in the same country but we allow for a di¤erent sector-specic role of the same
variables in the portfolio choice problem. In other words, in the model we assume a
di¤erent perceived variance at investor level while in the empirical implementation,
constrained by data availability, we just consider di¤erent elasticities of nancial
investors and households to the same country-specic proxy. In the actual regression
analysis we also include some dummies which might, a priori, capture investment
barriers. Consequently, our nal estimable regression, including i regressors and n
dummies, will be the following
log
 
wklj
MSj
!
= +
X
i
i;k log(rel_proxyilj) +
X
n
n;kdummynlj + "
k
lj (4)
After having implemented a regression for households and nancial investors we
test whether the coe¢ cients are statistically di¤erent by running the following com-
plementary regression
log(wHlj )  log(wFlj) =  +
X
i
i log(rel_proxyilj) +
X
n
ndummynlj + "
k
lj (5)
10
where the subscripts H and F denote, respectively, households and nancial
investors. The coe¢ cient i is equal to (i;H   i;F ) and n is equal to (n;H  
n;F ). By testing the null hypothesis that i = 0 (and analogously for n) we
test the hypothesis that country-level factors are equally important in determining
portfolio allocation for more sophisticated investors -professional investors- and less
sophisticated investors -households13. Results against the null hypothesis, that is
coe¢ cients signicantly di¤erent from zero in the expected direction14, support, in
statistical terms, our thesis15.
3 Empirical analysis
We consider, for the period 2001-2004, four European investing countries -France,
Italy, Spain and Sweden- for which the breakdown by sector holder in CPIS (Coordi-
nated Portfolio Investment Survey, by IMF) is available and for which we found data
on the fraction of equity assets held by various institutional sectors within a country
(OECD, National Accounts, Financial Balance Sheets)16. Many recent papers rely
on the CPIS data source (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2005, 2007; Faruqee et al., 2004;
13In this paper we focus on the informational motive ignoring any other factor such as hedging
motives. This restricted perspective, although debatable, is supported by two key considerations.
The rst one is that hedging motives have shown to have a negligible explanatory power for the home
bias phenomenon (Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Baxter and Jermann, 1997). The second is that,
in order to signicantly a¤ect our results, one should claim that the excluded factors are expected
to have a di¤erent impact for di¤erent investors. In fact, the e¤ect of all possible determinants
-not only hedging motives- left out of the analysis do cancel out if they enter simmetrically for all
investors so leaving una¤ected our results.
14The sign of the coe¢ cient depends on whether the proxy is aimed at capturing investment
barrier rather than reduction in investment barrier.
15Please note that the above regression (??) allows to test the di¤erence in coe¢ cients without
performing the Wald test which would require a computationally heavier procedure -for instance a
Seemingly Unrelated Regression- in order to compare coe¢ cients of separate regressions.
16See Appendix C for further details on data.
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Sorensen et al., 2007) but none -to the best of our knowledge- exploits the breakdown
by investing sector.
We consider two investing categories: the householdssector comprising house-
holds and non prot organizations and the nancial investors sector comprising
banks, pension funds and insurance companies, mutual funds and other nancial
auxiliaries.
The destination stock markets are 20 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United
States17.
The way di¤erent variables a¤ect foreign holdings depends on how domestic and
foreign investors evaluate these factors for investment purposes. The total market
capitalization in any country must be held in aggregate by some investors so a country
cannot be underweighted in portfolio by all investors. French and Poterba (1991)
suggest that investors may simply be relatively more optimistic about their domestic
markets. This assertion is conrmed by Strong and Xu (2003) and Li (2004) showing,
using di¤erent datasets, as fund managers or investors in general are more optimistic
about their home stock market. Notwithstanding the notable attempts proposed in
the literature (Lewis, 1999), the strong familiarity factor behind home bias is still
hard to be captured making asymmetric- for domestic and foreign investors- the
impact of an observable stock characteristic on investment decisions. If a country-
17Since we focus on foreign portfolio allocation, the destination stock markets are 19 as the
domestic country is excluded from the analysis. The Pooled-OLS regression is run, therefore, on
304 observations (19 observations for each year, for each investing country).
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specic factor lowers costs symmetrically for home and foreign investors there will be
no impact on foreign position. If, on the contrary, it lowers (increases) the deadweight
cost for foreign more than for domestic investors then more (fewer) foreign investors
will be attracted to invest in the country and fewer (more) domestic will hold local
equities.
When looking at the portfolio composition into domestic and foreign equities in
table 1 we nd some interesting regularities. First, all four countries considered dis-
play home bias with a domestic position ranging from 0.55 to 0.78. Second, the home
bias for households is much larger than for nancial investors: the domestic share for
households ranges from 0.76 for Italy to 0.94 for Spain while for professional investors
the range goes from 0.29 for Italy to 0.60 for France. This preliminary evidence sug-
gests that, at least for the countries considered, investment patterns for households
and nancial investors might be quite di¤erent and it is worth investigating whether
a similar degree of diversity is present also within the foreign portfolio and which
are its main determinants. Since now on, in our work we will ignore any explicit
explanation relative to the home bias phenomenon and focus on the determinants of
foreign positions18.
18Even though domestic positions are not explicitly investigated here, they, of course, enter
indirectly in our analysis since the weight of each foreign stock index in the overall portfolio depends
also on the domestic share.
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3.1 Portfolio determinants of households and nancial in-
vestors
We claim that since households have less easily access to foreign rm-level information
they rely much more heavily on country-level factors.
In this section we consider results from regression (4): results for nancial in-
vestors and households are reported in table 2 and table 3, respectively. Results
are also shown for the representative national investor (table 4) to allow comparison
with nancial investors and households. Discussion on the statistical signicance of
the di¤erence households-nancial investors is deferred to the next section (table 5).
3.1.1 Indirect barriers
Proximity variables The rst variables included in the regression analysis are
the proximity variables. Market proximity captures the inuence of asymmetric
information on investors portfolio choice (Gehrig, 1993; Brennan and Cao, 1997;
Kang and Stulz, 1997). Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Faruqee et al.(2004), Chan
et al. (2005), Portes and Rey (2005) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005, 2007) all
nd that the cultural and geographic proximity of the market has an important
inuence on investor stock holdings and trading.
The variables we include as capturing proximity are distance, common border
dummy and common language dummy19. The rst two variables simply capture
physical distance between the country of the investor and the destination country20.
19See Appendix B for further details.
20A separate role for the dummy border can be found when considering this variable as "correct-
ing" the distance variable which is measured as the great circle distance between the capital cities
of the destination and investing country. Please note that the variable entering our regression is the
14
Since transactions in nancial assets are "weightless" a role for distance may be
found only if it has an informational content (Portes and Rey, 2005). The role for
the common language dummy is more easily interpretable as foreign languages makes
more di¢ cult collecting information and this is likely to be a serious issue mainly for
non professional investors.
We expect to nd a stronger role of proximity variables for households than for
nancial investors, as already found by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) for Finland.
The rst noticeable result, looking at columns (1) in Table 2 and Table 3, is the
strong explanatory power of these regressors. The Adj-R2 is indeed 39% for pro-
fessional investors and to 52% for households denoting a relatively stronger role for
households. The second point to stress is that the impact of the proximity vari-
ables is strongly signicant in statistical terms and quite large in economic terms for
both nancial investors and households. Finally, the coe¢ cients are much larger for
households than for nancial investors. The point estimate of the elasticity between
the ratio of portfolio share to market share and the distance is about -1.3 for house-
holds and -0.9 for nancial investors while point estimates are more than twice as
large for households in the proximity dummies (border and language). In particular,
contiguity enhances the portfolio share to market share ratio by more than 50% for
nancial investors (e0:448 = 1:565) while for households sharing a common border
induces investments such that the portfolio share to market share ratio is 2.5 times
larger. Sharing a common language has almost the same quantitative e¤ect than
contiguity for nancial investors while it has a much stronger impact for households
relative distance between investing and destination country (see Appendix B for further details).
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increasing portfolio share to market share by 6 times.
Transparency We include, as potential explanatory variable, an index capturing
the degree of opacity of the destination countries (Kurtzman et al., 2004).21 The
empirical literature on nancial investments has assessed the relevance of small scale
risks: fraudulent transactions, bribery, unenforceable contracts, legal and regulation
complexity unequivocally deter investment. Previous literature has mainly docu-
mented that these institutional factors a¤ect foreign direct investments. Recently,
Gelos and Wei (2005), adopting opacity indexes similar to the one considered here,
nd that country transparency a¤ects also portfolio investment in emerging markets.
We check whether a role of opacity in foreign portfolio investments exists also when
restricting the analysis to developed stock markets and whether this role - if any-
is stronger for less sophisticated investors to which rm-specic information may be
available less easily than to nancial investors.
Interestingly, this relative opacity index shows the expected negative sign for
both investors but is statistically signicant only for households (column 2). The
elasticity is higher than 1 so quite large in economic terms: an increase of the rel-
ative opacity index by 50% halves the portfolio share to market share ratio. After
the inclusion of the opacity index, the proximity variables coe¢ cients appear sub-
stantially unchanged for professional investors, where this proxy has no signicant
impact, but also coe¢ cients of proximity variables for households are only modestly
a¤ected. Therefore, our results seem to suggest that transparency of a country en-
hances foreign portfolio investments alleviating information asymmetry only for non
21We consider as regressor the relative opacity index, i.e. the country opacity relative to the
average world opacity (see Appendix B for further details).
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professional investors.
Common exchange market: Euronext Finally, we consider the "natural ex-
periment" Euronext creation to test whether common-listing, that is listing on a
common exchange platform, has any e¤ect on stock portfolio decisions and whether
the impact, if any, depends upon the sophistication of the investor. Ahearne et al.
(2004), Pagano et al. (2002), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) and Sarkissian and
Shill (2004) evidence how foreign rms publicly listing in a common exchange, subject
to standardized regulations and homogenizations of accounting rules, are preferred
by investors since cross-listing has the e¤ect of reducing information asymmetry22.
Following this perspective, we consider the e¤ects of the Euronext creation. In Sep-
tember 2000 the Euronext is formed by the stock exchanges of Paris, Brussels and
Amsterdam. In February 2002 Euronext continues to grow and merges with the Por-
tuguese exchange23. We add the Euronext-dummy to our regression in order to check
whether forming a common stock exchange with standardized nancial regulations
may be perceived by investors as a reduction of information barriers. Moreover, if the
common listing has an informational content then we would expect it to be stronger
for households than for nancial investors who may rely more easily on other more
specic (and costly) sources of information. Results reported in column 3, indeed,
support our conjecture. The coe¢ cient has the expected positive sign for both kinds
22Following a similar perspective, Vlachos (2004) highlights the relevance of regulatory harmo-
nization as determinant of cross-country portfolio holdings based on the CPIS dataset.
23In 2002 Euronext merges also with the LIFFE (London International Financial Futures and
Options Exchange). This merger is, however, not considered here since it is a future exchange
and not strictly a stock exchange. In April 2007, Euronext merged with NYSE (New York Stock
Exchange) creating the larger stock exchange in the world. For obvious reasons, this merger cannot
be object of investigation in the present work.
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of investors but is large and statistically signicant only for households: trading in a
common stock exchange platform increases the portfolio share to market share ratio
by about three times.
Control for liquidity Padilla and Pagano (2006) have recently found that
the integration of the Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon and Paris exchanges in a single
platform resulted in a signicant increase in liquidity24. Therefore, in order to exactly
pick up the informational Euronext e¤ect, it is crucial accounting also for liquidity.
We consider a variable capturing the relative illiquidity of the market adopted by
Bortolotti et al. (2007). It is a measure of price impact which is the aggregate version
of Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. The market illiquidity of a stock market is
dened as the ratio of absolute return on the stock index to turnover, capturing
the response of the stock index return to turnover. Since our portfolio holdings are
recorded at annual frequency we need an average annual illiquidity measure. We
compute the illiquidity of a stock market in year t as the annual average of daily
illiquidity where d represents the day, jRdtj is the absolute return on day d and D is
the number of trading days in year t:25 TURNdt represents the total value of shares
traded scaled by total daily market capitalization.
illiqt =
1
D
X
d
jRdtj
TURNdt
The higher the reaction of stock index return to a given turnover rate, the higher
24Sarkissian and Shill (2004) point out some evidence on the role of liquidity in the choice of
listing abroad.
25The index return and turnover rates are computed as the weighted average of all stocks included
in the index (each stock is weighted by its relative stock market capitalization).
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the illiquidity of the stock market. In particular we consider the logarithm of the
relative illiquidity measure capturing the relative illiquidity of the stock market j
relative to the world illiquidity26. Results in column 4a show that the illiquidity
measure has the expected negative sign and is signicant for both types of investors,
although the coe¢ cient point estimate is more than two times larger for households
than for nancial investors. The same result applies when considering the annual
turnover rate (column 4b) as alternative27, and more commonly adopted, measure of
liquidity (Levine, 1997; Dhalquist and Robertsson, 2001; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti,
2007)
turnt =
1
D
X
d
TURNdt
These results conrm that the Euronext dummy has an informational content
per se further stressing the high relevance of aggregate informational barriers for less
sophisticated investors28.
26The same procedure is followed when we consider the turover rate as alternative to the illiquidity
measure.
27The two alternative measures of liquidity/illiquidity we consider have an average correlation
coe¢ cient equal to -0.53. It evidences, on one side, the existence of a strong linkage among them
and, on the other, the fact that they must capture di¤erent aspects as their correlation coe¢ cient
is far below unity. As pointed out in Bortolotti et al. (2007), the Amihud (2002) index is a better
proxy for market (il)liquidity than the turnover ratio since the latter may not account for all aspects
of market liquidity (Hasbrouk, 2003).
28As pointed out by Padilla and Pagano (2005), the merger of stock exchanges also determines a
reduction in direct costs. However, since nancial investors are those who more frequently turnover
their portfolios they should be more a¤ected than households by these costs. Under this consider-
ation, the fact that the Euronext-dummy plays a role for households supports even more strongly
our informational hypothesis.
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Control for EMU Finally, since members in Euronext are also EMU mem-
bers, the Euronext e¤ect could simply capture the relative attractiveness of EMU
countries for EMU due to elimination of exchange rate risk documented in the recent
literature (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007; Berkel, 2004). We therefore include the
EMU dummy in our analysis in order to disentangle the informational impact of
Euronext29. Results in columns 4a and 4b show that the Euro dummy is, for both
investors, economically and statistically relevant: sharing a common currency deter-
mines portfolio share to market share ratio much larger than for non members of
currency unions (5 times larger for nancial investors and more than 8 times larger
for households). It is worth noticing that controlling for liquidity and for the EMU
dummy does actually reduce the impact of the Euronext dummy for households but
the coe¢ cient remains very large: investing in countries listing in a common exchange
market increases the dependent variable by 2.4 times rather than by 3 times.
3.1.2 Additional results and robustness check
Return-chasing or contrarian trading? In Gompers and Metricks (2001)
love for liquidity as well as contrarian trading behavior are identied as characteristics
of large investors. Since households are, typically, small investors, there might be
some variables included in our analysis correlated with past reward to risk ratio and
so inuencing our results. We therefore include the relative lagged Sharpe ratio30 in
our regression analysis showing the relative results in column 5 of each table31. We
29Note that, among investors, Italy and Spain are EMU but not Euronext members and, among
destination countries, Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Spain are EMU but not Euronext members
30See Appendix B for details.
31Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) consider the same regressor nding mixed results on its signif-
icance for the representative country investor.
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nd no signicant role for lagged Sharpe ratio neither for households nor for nancial
investors and other coe¢ cients are left almost unchanged.
Restrictions to capital mobility Finally, we add, as further control, a vari-
able capturing direct investment barriers that is restrictions to international capital
mobility. The strand of literature trying to explain the lack of portfolio diversi-
cation through the existence of barriers to international investment dates back to
contributions by Black (1974), Stulz (1981) and Errunza and Losq (1981). Since
the relaxation of capital controls occurred over the last decades has not signicantly
induced a parallel drop in home bias, the direct transaction costsexplanation has
been considered an inadequate explanation of portfolio holdings (Ahearne et al.,
2004; Berkel, 2004). In fact, we nd the same results when considering the represen-
tative country investor in table 4: column 6 shows how capital control variables have
no impact on foreign portfolio holdings32. However, it is worth stressing that the
institutional explanation has revealed to be unsatisfactory when considering aggre-
gate investment by the representative country investor or by particular institutional
investors, typically mutual funds (Chan et al., 2005). In fact, direct costs might
have, a priori, a di¤erent impact on households and nancial investors since they
operate on a diverse scale33. Consequently, we include here the direct costsexplana-
tion of cross-border investment as it could interact with our results on informational
barriers.
32When considering only OECD destination countries, the "source component" of capital control
is statistically signicant. Note that table 4, considering all institutional sectors, includes also
government and non nancial corporations (excluded from the analysis) beyond households and
nancial institutions.
33Financial investors, typically larger and more sophisticated, may be rationally less a¤ected by
costly procedures to foreign investment.
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Since it is not so easy to identify a bilateral specic cost, Clj, it is decomposed
into two components: the source component(Cl), i.e. the costs that investor faces
to transfer funds out of her own country l, and the host component(Cj), i.e. the
cost faced to entercountry j:
log(
1
Dlj
) = a log (
1
Dl
)|{z}
source
+ b log (
1
Dj
)| {z }
host
We adopt an index measuring the restrictions countries impose on capital ows
derived from the Economic Freedom Network (Chan et al., 2005, among the others,
adopt the same index)34. It is an index (0-10) assigning a lower rating to countries
with more restrictions on foreign capital transactions35. We consider the relative host
(source) capital mobility index, that is the index of capital mobility of the destination
market j (investing country l) divided by the average capital mobility index.
Our results, displayed in column 6, show how the "source component" of cap-
ital mobility variables has, indeed, a relevant explanatory power for both types of
investors with a stronger impact for households.
Summing up, the important result is that, even after controlling for past reward
to risk ratio and capital control, our results on the di¤erent impact of country-level
informational asymmetry are still there.
No Hong Kong and Singapore Finally, we run the above regression ex-
cluding Hong Kong and Singapore from the pool of destination stock markets for
34Edison and Warnock (2003) propose an alternative measure of capital controls based on In-
ternational Finance Corporations (IFC) emerging market indices. However, it cannot be adopted
here since we restrict the analysis to developed countries.
35See Appendix B for further details.
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two kind of reasons. The rst one is that they play also a relevant role as o¤shore
nancial centers and it might have the e¤ect of distorting investorsdecisions for
reasons lying beyond the scope of this work. The second motive is related to possi-
ble (explicit or implicit) constraints, especially for pension funds and life-insurance
companies (Davis, 2001), restricting non-OECD foreign asset holdings. The results
are displayed in the last column of each table: the signicance and the magnitude
of regression coe¢ cients remain unchanged and our results are not a¤ected by the
exclusion of Hong Kong and Singapore.
A nal consideration comes from the comparison of table 2, 3 and 4. As it can
be noticed, the results in table 4 referred to the whole investing economy, are fairly
similar to table 2 which refers to institutional investors. It goes in the direction of
conrming Chan et al (2005)s conjecture that mutual funds investment patterns -
and, more in general, institutional investorspatterns- reect the investment behavior
of the representative investor of a country. At the same time, the neat di¤erence in
results between households and the overall economy reveals that the representative
country investor is far from "representing" the representative household.
3.2 Testing di¤erences households-nancial investors
To test the di¤erent impact of informational barriers on households portfolio choice
with respect to nancial investors, we run regression (5) where the dependent variable
is the log(wHlj =w
F
lj) and the coe¢ cients exactly capture the wedge in sensitivity to
country-level factors by households with respect to nancial investors. Results are
reported in table 5. Had the e¤ect of one regressor been equal for households and
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professional investors we should have observed its coe¢ cient equal to zero, or not
signicantly di¤erent from zero. For instance, the hypothesis of null coe¢ cient for
distance is not rejected so revealing that the e¤ect of this variable on the two kinds
of investors is not statistically di¤erent. For the other proximity variables (border
and language), for opacity and the Euronext dummy the coe¢ cient is statistically
di¤erent from zero36 underlying a signicant di¤erent impact of these variables on
households and nancial investors in the expected direction. Summing up, with
the exception of distance, for all other variables capturing information asymmetry at
country-level the e¤ect on households is statistically larger than on nancial investors.
Sensitivity analysis: one country out As a nal robustness check, we con-
sider whether our results, based on a pooled regression including four countries,
are driven by one particular investing country. We display our regression results
in columns 2a, 3a, 4a and 5a of table 5 when, respectively, France, Italy, Spain or
Sweden are excluded from the sample37. The coe¢ cients show some variability when
one country is excluded38 but the evidence shows that our results are -comfortingly-
not driven by one single country since the wedge households-nancial investors re-
mains even after the alternative exclusion of all countries. In columns (#b) the same
results are reported when only OECD countries are included in the pool of destina-
tion countries. Under all sample specications, the variables proxying information
36Also the host capital control variable, the EMU-dummy and illiquidity show a signicant dif-
ferent impact for households and nancial investors.
37When France is excluded from the sample, the Euronext dummy is, necessarily, excluded from
the regression.
38The variability of coe¢ cients is quite reasonable since the exclusion of one country represents
a reduction by one-forth of the overall sample size. The Adj-R2 also displays some variability: it is
basically una¤ected by the exclusion of Italy, remarkably decreased by the exclusion of France and
Sweden while remarkably increased when Spain is neglected.
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asymmetry -with the exception of distance- display a signicantly larger impact for
households than for professional investors conrming our initial conjecture39.
4 Conclusions
We analyze the determinants of foreign portfolio allocations of more sophisticated
investors -nancial investors- and less sophisticated investors -households- in four Eu-
ropean countries, France, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Di¤erent degree of sophistication
implies di¤erent access to rmsspecic information and it may result in di¤erent
demand patterns. We evidence that households foreign portfolio investments are
more heavily inuenced by country-level informational barriers. In particular, we
uncover for households a stronger impact of proximity variables, transparency of the
destination stock market and a relevant role for the common stock exchange market
- Euronext - in enhancing information disclosure. This evidence highlights that dif-
ferences in the investment patterns of households and institutional investors might
be driven by the di¤erent degree of sophistication. Consequently, technological ad-
vances reducing "distance" among markets and any e¤ort of improving transparency
on nancial markets will plausibly result in a higher international portfolio diversi-
cation of householdsportfolio investment. Furthermore, this is the rst work, to our
knowledge, detecting a signicant informational role of the Euronext stock exchange
merger: less informed investors seem to benet from the information disclosure mech-
39It is worth pointing out how our results are not driven by the di¤erent positions of households
and nancial investors in domestic assets. In fact, the logarithmic specication makes coe¢ cients
invariant to scale factors. In other words, if the households foreign portfolio composition were
equal to the nancial investorsone except for the dimension of the foreign portfolio in the overall
portfolio, the coe¢ cients on our regressors would be identical and the scale factor would be captured
by the intercept.
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anisms connected with the common listing. In this turmoil period of stock market
consolidations, this result suggests that the convergence towards a common exchange
platform might represent an e¤ective mechanism alleviating information asymmetry
and enhancing international diversication for households.
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A Theoretical framework
Our theoretical framework is very standard and simply captures the equilibrium
portfolio allocations when investors are supposed to face di¤erent costs investing in
N stock markets. We assume our investor maximizes the expected value of a constant
relative risk aversion utility function
U(W ) =   exp

  W
W0

where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and W is nancial wealth.
The expected utility may be rewritten as
E [U(W )] =   exp

 

w0   
2
w0w

where w is the vector of weights,  is the vector of expected excess returns and
 is the variance-covariance matrix of stock returns.
Maximizing the above expected utility under the constraint
NX
s=1
ws = 1 we get
the standard mean-variance vector of optimal weights
w =
1

 1(   ri)
We adopt Gehrig (1993) approach in modelling information asymmetries (and
in general investment barriers). In Gehrig (1993) contribution foreign investments
appear on average more risky to domestic investors -leading to an information-based
justication to home bias- and the portfolio of each investor is di¤erent depending
on the perceived variance-covariance matrix. We consider this approach focussing on
foreign investment only, considering a di¤erent investor-specic perceived variability
of stock returns for each foreign stock index in the investment opportunity set.
Denoting by Cl the matrix of investment barriers we rewrite the personalized
vector of weights for each investor l in the following way
wl =
1

 1l (   ri)
where l = 
Cl (and therefore  1l = C
 1
l 

 1). We obtain
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wl = C
 1
l 

 1 1

(   ri) (6)
The diagonal NxN positive denite matrix Cl may be dened as
Cl =
26666664
Cl1 0       0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . Clj
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0       0 ClN
37777775
where Clj is the bilateral cost of holding country js stock by country ls investor.
As Clj stands for the investment barrier cost for country l investing in j , its
reciprocal
1
Clj
stands for a variable capturing the investment "advantage" of country
l investing in country j.
Therefore the equilibrium condition, equating stock demand and stock supply,
will be
MS = 
 1

1

(   ri)

(7)
where MS represents the vector of market shares of stock market indexes (sup-
ply side) and the right hand side is the (weighted) sum of stock indexesdemands
(demand side).  is a diagonal NxN positive denite matrix
 =
26666664
1 0       0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . j
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0       0 N
37777775
where j =
PL
l=1MSl
1
Clj
is the average investment "advantage" in holding asset
j
Let us dene Dl = Cl, where Dl is again a diagonal NxN positive denite
matrix. We can rewrite the above expression (6) as
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wl = D
 1
l 

 1  1

(   ri) (8)
where Dlj = jClj and
1
Dlj
=
1
CljPL
l=1MSl
1
Clj
and using the equilibrium condition (7) we get the following result
wl = D
 1
l MS (9)
or, in terms of individual asset, the following optimal portfolio weights
wlj =
1
Dlj
MSj (10)
1
Dlj
represents the relative (with respect to world average) "advantage" of country
l investing in asset j. In other words, the investor l will demand a share of assets
greater than the market share in proportion to 1
Dlj
(inverse of relative investment
cost). Note that if Clj = j, i.e. if the investment barrier for country l is equal to
the average then the investor l will hold the value market share of asset j.
B Data appendix
market share
Market shares refer to the values at December, 28th of each year from 2001 to
2004.
Source: Datastream, Thomson Financial
proximity variables
Distance
The distance is measured as the Great Circle distance in miles between capital
cities of source (l) and destination (j) country. The average distance from a destina-
tion country (j) is obtained as weighted (by market share) average of the distance of
investing countries. The variable included in the regression is the logarithm of the
ratio of the distance l   j to the average distance from country j:
33
Border dummy
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination
country share a common border (0 otherwise).
Language dummy
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination
country share a common language (0 otherwise)
opacity index
Index capturing the degree of opacity (Kurtzman et al., 2004) of a country. It
is a synthetic index capturing corruption, ine¢ cacy of the legal system, deleteri-
ous economic policies, inadequate accounting and governance practices, detrimental
regulatory structures. It is a synthetic measure (1-100) of indexes coming from 41
di¤erent sources (World Bank, IMF, International Securities Services Association,
International Country Risk Guide and Individual Countrys Regulations).
Euronext dummy (Common Stock Exchange dummy)
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination
country share the Euronext stock exchange platform (0 otherwise). In our case,
it coincides with a common stock exchange dummy since the investing countries
considered did not merge in a common stock exchange with other countries.
EMU dummy (Common Currency dummy)
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination
country are members of the European Monetary Union (0 otherwise). In our case, it
coincides with a common currency dummy since do not belong to any other currency
union.
illiquidity measure
The illiquidity measure is dened in the text. The average illiquidity is obtained
as weighted (by market share) average of country stock index illiquidity. The variable
included in the analysis is the relative illiquidity measure of country j, i.e. the ratio
of country j illiquidity on the average illiquidity.
Source: Datastream, Thomson Financials
turnover rate
The turnover rate is dened in the text. The average turnover rate is obtained as
weighted (by market share) average of country stock index turnover. The variable
included in the analysis is the relative turnover measure of country j, i.e. the ratio
of country j turnover on the average turnover.
Source: Datastream, Thomson Financials
relative Sharpe ratio
Similarly to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) we consider the average excess re-
turn of the country stock market relative to world return, divided by the standard
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deviation of the excess returns variability.
Source: authorscalculations based on Datastream data.
capital mobility index
The Economic Freedom Network constructs an index (0-10) measuring the re-
strictions countries impose on capital ows assigning a lower rating to countries with
more restrictions on foreign capital transactions.
In decreasing rating order are ranked countries where
 domestic investments by foreigners and foreign investments by local residents
are unrestricted
 investments are restricted in a few industries within the countries
 investments are permitted but regulatory restrictions slow the mobility of cap-
ital
 either domestic investments by foreigners or foreign investments by local resi-
dents require approval from government authorities
 both domestic by foreigners and foreign investments by local require govern-
ment approval
We consider capital mobility indexes for both the investor countrys index and the
destination country index as we do not have bilateral specic capital control indexes:
the barrier of country l investment in country j depends both on the restrictions
imposed by country l on outward investment and on the restrictions imposed by
country j on inward investment.
C Derived portfolios of institutional investors
Our dependent variable is the logarithm of foreign portfolio shares, that is the share
of each foreign stock index in the equity portfolio of a given investor. Foreign equity
holdings (in US$) are derived from Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS)
for the years 2001 to 2004. However, the CPIS does not provide domestic hold-
ings. This problem is circumvented by making use of complementary data sources
to derive the share of foreign assets in each portfolio (Sorensen et al., 2007; Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007; Amadi, 2006). In particular, we derive the stock market
capitalization of each investing country from Datastream and, from International
Financial Statistics (IFS), the foreign liabilities held by each investing country and
the foreign equities held by each country. Therefore, country l foreign share is given
by the ratio
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for equities held by l
MCAPl + for equities held by l   foreign liab held by l =
for equities held by l
equities held by country l
(11)
where the denominator represents the total amount (domestic and foreign) of
equities held by country l
As far as the portfolio at institutional sector level is concerned, very few countries
in CPIS provide details on the breakdown by sector holder and many countries report
incomplete surveys. From CPIS data on foreign holdings by institutional sector we
derive the ratio of foreign holdings by sector k on the total amount of equities held
by country l
for equities held by sector k in l
equities held by country l
(12)
In order to obtain the domestic holding position for each investing sector we
rely on an additional data source, the OECD National Accounts, Financial Balance
Sheets providing information on the fraction of wealth, split by instrument (equities,
short term securities, long term securities, etc.), held by a particular institutional
sector. Therefore, we derive for each institutional sector k in each country l the ratio
equities held by sector k in l
equities held by country l
(13)
Finally, by taking the ratio of (12) to (13), we can recover the ratio we are
interested in, that is the foreign share in each institutional sectors equity portfolio
allowing to derive the share of each foreign country in each sectors portfolio.
for equities held by sector k in l
equities held by sector k in l
(14)
The investing countries considered -France, Italy, Spain and Sweden- are the only
large investing countries providing the sectoral breakdown of equity holdings in the
CPIS and in the OECD database.
The households sector in the text is the aggregation of the Household sector
with the Other sector (non prot Organizations serving Households). The nancial
sector is obtained by merging Monetary authorities, Banks and Other Financial
Institutions. The sectors General Government and Non Financial Companies are
not considered in the analysis.
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Tables
Table 1. Domestic share in equity portfolio (by investor type)
The table shows the average portfolio shares in domestic equities for the period 2001-2004. The
rst row refers to the overall economy, the second and third row refer, respectively, to nancial
investors and to households and non prot organizations. Portfolio shares are reported for the four
investing countries considered in the analysis. Data are derived relying upon CPIS and OECD,
National Accounts, Financial Balance Sheets (See Appendix B for further details).
FRANCE ITALY SPAIN SWEDEN
SHARE IN DOMESTIC STOCK MARKET
 - overall economy 0.69 0.64 0.78 0.55
     -  financial institutions 0.60 0.29 0.33 0.34
    -  households and NPOs 0.90 0.76 0.94 0.83
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Table 2. Role of country factors in portfolio allocation: nancial insti-
tutions
The table reports results of the pooled OLS regression as in (4) in the text. A "Least Square
Dummy Variable Estimation" with xed e¤ects for investing countries is implemented. The de-
pendent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of portfolio share to market share, log(wFlj=MSj);
where the subscript lj represents the couple investment country l -destination country j while the
superscript F represents the "nancial institutions" sector in country l. Details on the variables
included as regressors are provided in Appendix A. Data on wFlj are at December, 31th of each
year (2001-2004) while regressors (when time variant) are average value within the relevant year to
avoid endogeneity issues. In column (8) Hong Kong and Singapore are excluded from the pool of
destination countries. Constants and time dummies are included but not reported. White (1980)
cross-section standard errors (d.f. corrected) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5) (6) (7)
(OECD only)
log(dist/av_dist) -0.956*** -0.949*** -0.932*** -0.530*** -0.529*** -0.528*** -0.453*** -0.376***
(0.106) (0.111) (0.115) (0.094) (0.096) (0.094) (0.098) (0.103)
dummy_border 0.448** 0.468** 0.483** 0.252* 0.259* 0.252* 0.276* 0.383***
(0.188) (0.198) (0.197) (0.147) (0.151) (0.147) (0.145) (0.137)
dummy_lang 0.448** 0.437* 0.442* 0.948*** 0.911*** 0.945*** 1.020*** 0.852***
(0.228) (0.252) (0.250) (0.278) (0.269) (0.277) (0.322) (0.313)
log(opacity/av_opacity) -0.080 -0.094 -0.397 -0.404 -0.391 -0.072 -0.148
(0.328) (0.327) (0.281) (0.285) (0.286) (0.249) (0.248)
Euronext dummy 0.251 -0.052 -0.039 -0.052 -0.042 0.068
(0.222) (0.230) (0.237) (0.230) (0.221) (0.221)
log(illiq_out/av_illiq) -0.231* -0.231* -0.222* -0.159
(0.136) (0.136) (0.124) (0.121)
log(turn_out/av_turn) 0.213
(0.148)
EMU dummy 1.604*** 1.598*** 1.604*** 1.535*** 1.373***
(0.212) (0.205) (0.213) (0.210) (0.206)
rel_Sharpe ratio 0.005 0.008 -0.012
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
log(cap_mob_out/av_cap_mob) 1.038* 1.501***
(0.543) (0.536)
log(cap_mob_in/av_cap_mob) -0.506 -0.533
(1.392) (1.498)
Observations 304 304 304 304 304 304 304 272
Adj-R 2 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.47
financial institutions
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Table 3. Role of country factors in portfolio allocation: households
and non prot organizations
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of portfolio share to market share, log(wH=MSj);
where the subscript lj represents the couple investment country l -destination country j while the
superscript H represents the "households and non prot institutions" sector in country l. Other-
wise the table is the same as table 2. Constants and time dummies are included but not reported.
White (1980) cross-section standard errors (d.f. corrected) are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5) (6) (7)
(OECD only)
log(dist/av_dist) -1.279*** -1.170*** -1.091*** -0.559*** -0.558*** -0.552*** -0.433*** -0.300***
(0.177) (0.182) (0.176) (0.118) (0.127) (0.118) (0.116) (0.095)
dummy_border 0.881*** 1.174*** 1.240*** 0.949*** 0.967*** 0.947*** 0.985*** 1.134***
(0.251) (0.295) (0.269) (0.203) (0.212) (0.203) (0.203) (0.194)
dummy_lang 1.821*** 1.656*** 1.679*** 2.498*** 2.395*** 2.486*** 2.606*** 2.285***
(0.233) (0.233) (0.231) (0.230) (0.211) (0.225) (0.289) (0.331)
log(opacity/av_opacity) -1.166*** -1.227*** -1.571*** -1.591*** -1.548*** -1.039*** -1.167***
(0.387) (0.386) (0.297) (0.308) (0.298) (0.297) (0.286)
Euronext dummy 1.162*** 0.874*** 0.900*** 0.872*** 0.880*** 0.889***
(0.358) (0.306) (0.299) (0.307) (0.300) (0.306)
log(illiq_out/av_illiq) -0.590*** -0.589*** -0.575*** -0.433***
(0.146) (0.145) (0.124) (0.111)
log(turn_out/av_turn) 0.529***
(0.165)
EMU dummy 2.120*** 2.101*** 2.118*** 2.009*** 1.711***
(0.226) (0.218) (0.225) (0.232) (0.218)
rel_Sharpe ratio 0.018 0.023 -0.021
(0.028) (0.030) (0.022)
log(cap_mob_out/av_cap_mob) 1.651*** 2.461***
(0.557) (0.447)
log(cap_mob_in/av_cap_mob) 0.782 0.490
(1.151) (1.103)
Observations 304 304 304 304 304 304 304 272
Adj-R 2 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.72
households and no profit organizations
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Table 4. Role of country factors in portfolio allocation: all investors
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of portfolio share to market share, log(wTOTlj =MSj);
where the subscript lj represents the couple investment country l -destination country j while the
superscript TOT indicates the "representative investor" in country l. Otherwise the table is the
same as table 2 and table 3. Constants and time dummies are included but not reported. White
(1980) cross-section standard errors (d.f. corrected) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5) (6) (7)
(OECD only)
log(dist/av_dist) -0.867*** -0.885*** -0.860*** -0.510*** -0.507*** -0.509*** -0.472*** -0.391***
(0.115) (0.114) (0.119) (0.106) (0.104) (0.106) (0.113) (0.107)
dummy_border 0.683*** 0.634** 0.655** 0.447** 0.450** 0.446** 0.459** 0.578**
(0.221) (0.228) (0.227) (0.216) (0.215) (0.216) (0.216) (0.211)
dummy_lang 0.305 0.333 0.340* 0.696*** 0.709*** 0.694*** 0.731*** 0.534***
(0.205) (0.208) (0.256) (0.251) (0.237) (0.250) (0.274) (0.282)
log(opacity/av_opacity) 0.192 0.173 -0.124 -0.120 -0.119 -0.036 -0.049
(0.394) (0.391) (0.340) (0.348) (0.343) (0.169) (0.312)
Euronext dummy 0.365 0.038 0.057 0.037 0.047 0.163
(0.224) (0.259) (0.263) (0.261) (0.255) (0.256)
log(illiq_out/av_illiq) -0.041 -0.040 -0.036 0.040
(0.172) (0.173) (0.169) (0.172)
log(turn_out/av_turn) 0.079
(0.161)
EMU dummy 1.397*** 1.406*** 1.396*** 1.362*** 1.168***
(0.271) (0.264) (0.271) (0.267) (0.276)
rel_Sharpe ratio 0.004 0.005 -0.019
(0.026) (0.027) (0.030)
log(cap_mob_out/av_cap_mob) 0.507 1.014*
(0.614) (0.586)
log(cap_mob_in/av_cap_mob) -0.943 -0.902
(1.525) (1.627)
Observations 304 304 304 304 304 304 304 272
Adj-R 2 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.40
all institutional sectors
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Table 5. Test of di¤erent impact of country factors for households and
nancial investors
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of portfolio share of households to portfolio
share of nancial investors, log(wHlj )   log(wFlj); where the subscript lj represents the couple
investment country l -destination country j while the superscript H and F represent, respectively,
"households and non prot institutions" and "nancial institutions" in country l. Columns (#a)
report values when Hong Kong and Singapore are included in the regression while in columns
(#b) values are referred to the case in which only OECD destination countries are considered. .
Constants and time dummies are included but not reported. White (1980) cross-section standard
errors (d.f. corrected) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1,
5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
log(dist/av_dist) 0.020 0.076 0.062 0.066 -0.042 0.034 0.056 0.150** 0.038 0.106**
(0.060) (0.056) (0.098) (0.100) (0.066) (0.064) (0.077) (0.060) (0.075) (0.066)
dummy_border 0.709*** 0.751*** 0.851*** 0.835*** 0.752*** 0.834*** 0.556*** 0.668*** 0.659*** 0.669***
(0.149) (0.152) (0.223) (0.217) (0.126) (0.122) (0.167) (0.172) (0.207) (0.210)
dummy_lang 1.585*** 1.432*** 1.452*** 1.418*** 1.462*** 1.269*** 1.927*** 1.617*** 1.432*** 1.204***
(0.151) (0.146) (0.262) (0.260) (0.169) (0.153) (0.163) (0.199) (0.160) (0.129)
log(opacity/av_opacity) -0.968*** -1.019*** -0.942*** -0.982*** -1.005*** -1.061*** -0.893*** -1.034*** -0.962*** -0.943***
(0.151) (0.149) (0.202) (0.202) (0.177) (0.175) (0.169) (0.152) (0.177) (0.183)
Euronext dummy 0.921*** 0.821*** - - 1.156*** 1.0786*** 0.635*** 0.567** 0.967*** 0.863***
(0.236) (0.238) (0.240) (0.243) (0.239) (0.244) (0.235) (0.239)
log(illiq_out/av_illiq) -0.353*** -0.274*** -0.348*** -0.312*** -0.384*** -0.286*** -0.198** -0.106 -0.474*** -0.386***
(0.063) (0.067) (0.091) (0.095) (0.085) (0.085) (0.088) (0.086) (0.067) (0.070)
EMU dummy 0.474*** 0.338** 0.520*** 0.476** 0.053 -0.143 0.825*** 0.620*** 0.542*** 0.433**
(0.125) (0.138) (0.185) (0.201) (0.169) (0.169) (0.140) (0.148) (0.098) (0.100)
rel_Sharpe ratio 0.015 -0.010 0.005 -0.011 0.011 -0.018 0.022 -0.008 0.026 0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
log(cap_mob_out/av_cap_mob) 0.613* 0.960*** 0.390 0.426 0.292 0.719 1.377*** 1.919*** 0.399 0.822*
(0.314) (0.332) (0.448) (0.496) (0.416) (0.441) (0.326) (0.267) (0.379) (0.429)
log(cap_mob_in/av_cap_mob) 1.288 1.023 1.599* 1.192 1.068 0.605 0.588 1.025 1.432 1.116
(0.890) (0.887) (0.948) (0.951) (1.663) (1.707) (1.129) (1.179) (0.886) (0.881)
Observations 304 272 228 204 228 204 228 204 228 204
Adj-R 2 0.40 0.44 0.30 0.31 0.41 0.47 0.56 0.62 0.31 0.33
Test difference households-financial investors
no Swedenno Spainno Italyno Franceall countries
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